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OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff delivery drivers Ever Bedoya, Diego Gonzalez, 
and Manuel Decastro (collectively, “the Drivers”) filed a 
putative class action against Defendant American Eagle 
Express, Inc., (“AEX”), alleging that AEX misclassified them 
as independent contractors when they are actually employees 
under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”), N.J. 
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Stat. Ann. §§ 34:11-56a to -56a3, and the New Jersey Wage 
Payment Law (“NJWPL”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:11-4.1 to -
4:14.  AEX moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing that the Drivers’ claims are 
preempted by the Federal Aviation Authorization 
Administration Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501-
06.  The District Court denied AEX’s motion and certified the 
order for interlocutory appeal.  Because the FAAAA does not 
preempt the New Jersey law for determining employment 
status for the purposes of NJWHL and NJWPL, we will affirm 
the order and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I 
 
AEX is a logistics company that provides delivery 
services to various medical organizations.  The Drivers are 
New Jersey residents who make deliveries for AEX.  The 
Drivers filed this putative class action against AEX seeking, 
among other things, a judgment declaring that they are 
employees of AEX, rather than independent contractors, which 
entitles them to compensation under the NJWHL and NJWPL.1  
AEX moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the 
FAAAA preempts the Drivers’ claims.   
 
The District Court denied AEX’s motion, Bedoya v. 
Am. Eagle Express, Civ. No. 14-2811, 2017 WL 4330351, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017), reasoning that “[t]here is no clear 
indication” that Congress intended for the FAAAA to preempt 
state wage laws, Dkt. 109 at 6, 10, and that the connection 
between regulation of AEX’s workforce and the “prices, 
                                              
1 The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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routes, and services” provided to its consumers is too 
attenuated to justify preempting claims under the NJWHL and 
NJWPL, id. at 8-9.  We now consider AEX’s interlocutory 
appeal of the order denying the motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).  Bedoya, 2017 WL 4330351, at *1-4.   
 
II2 
 
A 
 
The question before us is whether the FAAAA preempts 
New Jersey’s test for determining employment classification 
for purposes of the NJWHL and NJWPL.  Under this test, 
workers performing services for a given company in exchange 
for pay are deemed employees unless the company can 
demonstrate each of the following: 
 
A. Such individual has been and will continue to 
be free from control or direction over the 
                                              
2 We review an order granting or denying a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings de novo.  Zimmerman v. Corbett, 
873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 
226 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Judgment will not be 
granted unless the movant “clearly establishes there are no 
material issues of fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 
220 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  In considering a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, we must accept as true all facts 
presented in the complaint and answer and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party—here, the 
Drivers.  Id. at 417-18.  While AEX implores us to look beyond 
the pleadings, we may not.   
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performance of such service, both under his 
contract of service and in fact; and 
 
B. Such service is either outside the usual course 
of the business for which such service is 
performed, or that such service is performed 
outside of all the places of business of the 
enterprise for which such service is 
performed; and  
 
C. Such individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C) (“New Jersey ABC 
classification test”).  Where a company successfully 
demonstrates all three elements with respect to a worker, that 
worker qualifies as an independent contractor under the 
NJWHL and NJWPL.  Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 
449, 458 (N.J. 2015).  The company, in turn, is exempt from 
requirements under those statutes with respect to the worker.  
Id.  For individuals classified as employees, however, the 
employing company is subject to each statute’s obligations, 
including minimum and overtime wage requirements, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a4, conditions regarding the time and 
mode of pay, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.2, 4.2a, and restrictions 
on pay deductions, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.4.   AEX contends 
that the New Jersey ABC classification test is preempted by the 
FAAAA.  
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B 
 
The preemption doctrine stems from the Supremacy 
Clause, which provides that “the Laws of the United States . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Thus, “Congress 
. . . has the power to preempt state law.”  In re Vehicle Carrier 
Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 83 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing 
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)), cert denied sub 
nom., Alban v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 138 S. Ct. 
114 (2017).  There are three categories of preemption: field 
preemption, conflict preemption, and express preemption.  
Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 
2009) (citing Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).   
 
Because preemption is an affirmative defense, we 
examine the specific preemption defense asserted.  In re 
Vehicle, 846 F.3d at 84 (citing Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 1591 (2015)).  AEX argues that New Jersey’s ABC 
classification test is subject to express preemption under 49 
U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).  “Express preemption requires a[n] 
analysis of whether ‘[s]tate action may be foreclosed by 
express language in a congressional enactment.’”  Lupian v. 
Joseph Cory Holdings, LLC, 905 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001)).  
 
In evaluating AEX’s argument, we first decide whether 
the presumption against preemption applies.  City of Columbus 
v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 438 
(2002) (applying the presumption against preemption in the 
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FAAAA context).  Under this presumption, “the historic police 
powers of the States” are “not to be superseded by [a] [f]ederal 
[a]ct unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”  Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 
680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 
555, 565 (2009)).  Thus, we “presume claims based on laws 
embodying state police powers are not preempted.”  In re 
Vehicle, 846 F.3d at 84; see also Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 
97, 116 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
Many employment regulations, such as the wage laws 
at issue here, seek to ensure workers receive fair pay.  Because 
they protect workers, they are within New Jersey’s police 
power, and the presumption against preemption by federal law 
applies.  See, e.g., Lupian, 905 F.3d at 131 (stating wage laws 
that protect workers represent an exercise of “police power”); 
see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 
(1987) (applying the presumption against preemption to a state 
labor law regarding severance pay “since the establishment of 
labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the 
State”).   
 
The presumption is rebutted where Congress had a 
“clear and manifest purpose” to preempt state laws.  Sikkelee, 
822 F.3d at 687 (citation omitted); see also Cipollone v. Liggett 
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (directing courts to 
examine congressional intent, the “ultimate touchstone” in 
discerning the preemptive scope of a statute (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)).  To determine Congress’ 
purpose, we look to the plain language of the statute and, if 
necessary, to the statutory framework as a whole.  Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (citation omitted).  
Thus, we next examine Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
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FAAAA and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), 
49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-130, an earlier statute with a similar 
preemption provision. 
 
C 
 
 In 1978, following a long period of heightened 
regulation, Congress enacted the ADA, which sought to 
deregulate the air-travel industry to “maxim[ize] reliance on 
competitive market forces.”  Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (quoting 49 U.S.C. App. § 
1302(a)(4)).  To ensure that this objective would not be 
frustrated by state regulation, Congress included a preemption 
provision providing that “no State . . . shall enact or enforce 
any law . . . relating to rates, routes, or services of any air 
carrier.”  Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 49 U.S.C. 
App. § 1305(a)).   
 
Congress enacted similar laws focused on deregulating 
interstate trucking, culminating with the passage of the 
FAAAA in 1994.  Lupian, 905 F.3d at 132-33.  Via the 
FAAAA, Congress sought to “level the playing field” between 
air carriers and motor carriers so that both could benefit from 
federal deregulation.  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 88 
(1994); see also Californians for Safe & Competitive Dump 
Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 
1998) (detailing FAAAA legislative history).  The FAAAA 
contains a preemption provision modeled after the ADA’s, 
providing, with limited exceptions, that: 
 
a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, 
regulation, or other provision having the force 
and effect of law related to a price, route, or 
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service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to 
the transportation of property. 
 
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).  Because of the parallels between the 
ADA and FAAAA, ADA cases are instructive regarding the 
scope of FAAAA preemption.  See Rowe v. N.H. Motor 
Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (analyzing FAAAA 
preemption using ADA cases as guidance).  As with the ADA, 
the FAAAA preemption provision’s central objective is to 
avoid frustrating the statute’s deregulatory purpose by 
preventing states from imposing “a patchwork of state service-
determining laws.”  Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 
U.S. 251, 264 (2013) (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373).  The 
FAAAA, however, has a qualifier that is absent from the ADA: 
the preempted state law must relate to prices, routes, or services 
“with respect to the transportation of property.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 14501(c)(1).  The Supreme Court has recognized that this 
language “massively limits the scope of preemption ordered by 
the FAAAA.”  Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 261 (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  
 
 Further insight into the limits of FAAAA preemption 
comes from the subjects Congress considered when enacting 
that statute.  “Congress identified ten jurisdictions (nine states 
and the District of Columbia . . . ) that did not regulate intrastate 
prices, routes, and services.”  Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Su, 903 
F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 
1187).  By implication, Congress determined that the laws then 
in existence in those jurisdictions did not contravene its 
deregulatory goals and thus were not preempted.  Id.   
 
The Supreme Court has also articulated several 
principles that inform us about the breadth of FAAAA 
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preemption.  First, the “related to” language from the FAAAA 
preemption clause gives it a broad scope, encompassing any 
state actions that have “a connection with, or [make] reference 
to . . . rates, routes, or services” of a motor carrier.  Nw., Inc. 
v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 280-81 (2014) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted) (interpreting the ADA).  While this 
language covers any state law that has a connection with or 
refers to “price[s], route[s], [or] service[s,]” id. at 280, “the 
breadth of the words ‘related to’ does not mean the sky is the 
limit,” Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 260.  Drawing from case law 
examining similar wording in the preemption provision of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a), see, e.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-84, the Supreme 
Court has observed that reading the phrase “related to” with 
“uncritical literalism” would render preemption an endless 
exercise, Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 260-61 (citation omitted), 
because “everything [is] relat[ed] to everything else in some 
manner[,]”  Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 
F.3d 429, 436 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing N.Y. State Conference of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 655 (1955)).   
 
Second, FAAAA preemption reaches laws that affect 
prices, routes, or services even if the effect “is only indirect.”  
Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 386).  
However, where a law’s impact on carrier prices, routes, or 
services is so indirect that the law affects them “in only a 
tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . manner,” the law is not 
preempted.  Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 261 (quoting Rowe, 552 
U.S. at 371); Morales, 504 U.S. at 390 (quoting Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).   
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Finally, preemption occurs where a state law has “a 
‘significant impact’ on carrier rates, routes, or services.”3  
Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Morales, 
504 U.S. at 390).   
 
Mindful of these principles, we next review the case law 
for guidance concerning whether a law has a direct or indirect 
effect and whether it has a significant or insignificant effect.  
From our review, we identify factors courts examine and set 
forth those factors that may shed light on a law’s directness and 
those that may reflect the significance of the law’s effect on the 
regulated entities at issue. 
 
D 
 
 Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court has recited 
precise standards for evaluating directness or significance, but 
cases addressing the issue provide some guidance.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has held that consumer protection 
and fraud laws used to regulate frequent-flyer programs could 
directly and significantly affect prices and services and are thus 
preempted.  See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 
223 (1995); Morales, 504 U.S. at 388-89.  Similarly, the Court 
determined that a Maine law requiring a specific procedure to 
verify the recipient of tobacco deliveries was preempted by the 
FAAAA because it dictated a service that tobacco motor 
carriers were required to provide for property they transported.  
Rowe, 552 U.S. at 372.  In addition, we recently observed that 
                                              
3 The Supreme Court also noted that “it makes no 
difference whether a state law is ‘consistent’ or ‘inconsistent’ 
with federal regulation.”  Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370 (quoting 
Morales, 504 U.S. at 386-87).   
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the FAAAA’s “preemption clause undoubtedly applies, for 
example, to state laws directly restricting types of goods that 
can be carried by trucks, tariffs, and barriers to entry.”  Lupian, 
905 F.3d at 135; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 86 (1994). 
 
On the other hand, the FAAAA itself, the Supreme 
Court, and the courts of appeals have identified laws that are 
too “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” from carrier prices, routes, 
and services to trigger preemption.  See, e.g., Rowe, 552 U.S. 
at 371; Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 646 (9th 
Cir. 2014).  The FAAAA explicitly exempts from preemption 
laws governing motor vehicle safety, local route controls based 
on vehicle size and weight, and driver insurance requirements.4  
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).  The Supreme Court has stated 
that the FAAAA does not preempt laws prohibiting 
prostitution, gambling, and “obscene depictions,” Morales, 
504 U.S. at 390, or those addressing zoning, Dan’s City, 569 
U.S. at 264.  We have observed that “garden variety 
employment claim[s]” evade ADA and FAAAA preemption 
because they are “too remote and too attenuated” from carrier 
prices, services, or routes.  Lupian, 905 F.3d at 134 (quoting 
Gary v. Air Grp., Inc., 397 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2005)).  As 
relevant to this case, we recently held that wage claims under 
the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”), 
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/1-115/15, are not preempted under the 
FAAAA because they are “too far removed from the statute’s 
                                              
4 The House of Representatives Conference Report 
specifies that the list provided in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2) and 
(3) is “not intended to be all inclusive, but merely to specify 
some of the matters which are not ‘prices, rates or services’ and 
which are therefore not preempted.”  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-
677, at 83. 
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purpose to warrant preemption.”  Lupian, 905 F.3d at 136.  
Many of our sister circuits have similarly held that the FAAAA 
and ADA do not preempt state employment laws.  See, e.g., 
Allied Concrete & Supply Co. v. Baker, 904 F.3d 1053, 1068 
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding California prevailing wage law for 
workers on public projects not preempted); Su, 903 F.3d at 957 
(holding California common law test for employee versus 
independent contractor status not preempted); Costello v. 
BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding 
Illinois wage law not preempted), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2289 
(2017); Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., 627 
F. App’x 744, 751 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding Miami-Dade 
County living wage ordinance as applied to air carriers not 
preempted); Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647 (holding California meal 
and rest-break laws not preempted); Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 
1189 (holding California wage law not preempted).   
 
From the language of the FAAAA preemption provision 
and these cases, we can distill several factors courts should 
consider when deciding whether a particular state law is 
FAAAA-preempted.  First, courts should examine whether the 
state law at issue applies to all businesses or whether it focuses 
on motor carriers.  Laws that are directed at “members of the 
general public” and that are not targeted at motor carriers are 
usually viewed as not having a direct effect on motor carriers.  
Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375.   
 
Even targeted laws, however, are not necessarily 
preempted.  We know from the FAAAA itself that state laws 
that may target motor carrier safety and insurance, or restrict 
local routes based on vehicle size and weight, are not 
preempted.  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2).  Conversely, laws of 
general applicability may nonetheless be preempted where 
 15 
they have a significant impact on the services a carrier 
provides.  See, e.g., DiFiore v. Am. Airlines Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 
88-89 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding generally applicable state tip 
law as applied to airlines preempted under the ADA because it 
“directly regulate[d] how an airline service is performed and 
how its price is displayed to customers”).  Thus, whether a law 
is applicable to every business or targets carriers is a helpful 
but nondispositive factor for determining whether a law has a 
direct effect on motor carriers’ prices, routes, or services.  
Morales, 504 U.S. at 386. 
 
Second, courts should consider whether the law 
addresses the carrier-employee relationship as opposed to the 
carrier-customer relationship.  “[G]enerally applicable state 
laws that affect the carrier’s relationship with its customers 
[differ from] those that affect the carrier’s relationship with its 
workforce.”  Costello, 810 F.3d at 1054; see also Su, 903 F.3d 
at 961-63 (noting same dichotomy); DiFiore, 646 F.3d at 88 
(preempting a Massachusetts law prohibiting employer from 
collecting fee advertised as “service charge” because the law 
regulates how a company performs services for its customers 
and “not merely how the airline behaves as an employer or 
proprietor”).   
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provides 
a useful analysis explaining why laws governing an employer’s 
relationship with its employees have too remote an impact to 
be preempted.  S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of 
Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Mendonca, 
152 F.3d at 1189).  The court examines whether the challenged 
state law regulates matters needed to operate the business, 
which it calls resource inputs, as opposed to laws governing 
the goods or services the business puts out, which it calls 
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product outputs.  Id.  The product outputs of the motor carrier 
industry are the services it provides—transportation of 
property from origin to destination.  Id.  The FAAAA’s focus 
on prices, routes, and services shows that the statute is 
concerned with the industry’s production outputs, and seeks to 
protect them from state regulation.  
 
Resource inputs, on the other hand, are the resources 
necessary for a business to create product outputs, including 
“labor, capital, and technology,” which may be regulated by 
various laws.  Id.  “For example, labor inputs are affected by a 
network of labor laws, including minimum wage laws, worker-
safety laws, anti-discrimination laws, and pension regulations.  
Capital is regulated by banking laws, securities rules, and tax 
laws, among others.  Technology is heavily influenced by 
intellectual property laws.”  Id.  Although laws that regulate 
inputs may impact costs and may in turn affect prices charged 
and services provided to customers, “no one thinks that the 
ADA or the FAAAA preempts these [regulations] and the 
many comparable state laws[.]”  Id.  That is because, 
notwithstanding the state laws’ indirect effects, they “operate 
one or more steps away from the moment at which the firm 
offers its customer[s] a service for a particular price” and 
therefore have too “remote” an effect on prices, routes, and 
services to be the intended target of preemption.  Id. (internal 
citations omitted); see also Su, 903 F.3d at 966 (stating that 
courts should examine “where in the chain of a motor carrier’s 
business [the state law] is acting to compel a certain result (e.g., 
consumer or work force), and what result it is compelling (e.g., 
certain wage, non-discrimination, a specific system of 
delivery, a specific person to perform the delivery)”); Costello, 
810 F.3d at 1055 (embracing S.C. Johnson, 697 F.3d at 558).  
In short, laws regulating labor inputs, such as wage laws, have 
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too remote an effect on the price the company charges, the 
routes it uses, and service outputs it provides and are less likely 
to be preempted by the FAAAA.  
  
Third, courts should consider whether the law binds the 
carrier to provide a particular price, route, or service.  As 
discussed above, the Supreme Court held that Maine’s 
identification requirements for tobacco deliveries required a 
motor carrier transporting tobacco to provide a particular 
service.  Rowe, 552 U.S. at 372.  Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit determined that Massachusetts’ 
ABC test for classifying employees in effect bound the carrier 
to provide its services using employees rather than independent 
contractors.  Schwann, 813 F.3d at 437.  Under Massachusetts’ 
independent contractor statute, only workers who perform a 
service that is outside the employer’s usual course of business 
may be classified as independent contractors.  Id. (quoting 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B(a)(2)).  Thus, application of 
Massachusetts’ test “in substance, bar[red] [the carrier at issue] 
from using any individuals as full-fledged independent 
contractors.”  Id.  In other words, the Massachusetts test 
essentially foreclosed the independent contractor classification 
of any of the carrier’s workers performing delivery services 
because such services were within the carrier’s usual course of 
business.  Id.  As a result, the Massachusetts statute bound the 
carrier to provide its services using employees and not 
independent contractors. 
 
The same was not true with laws that do not dictate a 
price, route, or service.  For example, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the FAAAA preempted a 
California law that requires employers to provide meal and rest 
breaks, reviewing, among other factors, whether the law bound 
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the carrier to specific prices, routes, or services.  Dilts, 769 F.3d 
at 649-50.  The court held that the FAAAA did not preempt 
California’s meal and rest-break laws.  Id.  The court relied 
partially on the fact that the California laws did not “set prices, 
mandate or prohibit certain routes, or tell motor carriers what 
services they may or may not provide, either directly or 
indirectly.”  Id. at 647.  Put simply, the law at issue did “not 
‘bind’ motor carriers to specific prices, routes, or services.”5  
Id. (citation omitted).    
 
Finally, courts examining a preemption challenge to a 
state law should be mindful of Congress’ goal of avoiding a 
“patchwork” of differing state “service-determining laws,” 
which could undermine its “major legislative effort to leave 
[decisions regarding the provision of services] to the 
competitive marketplace.”  Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373 (citing H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 87 (1994)).  This goal does not 
constitute a categorical imperative to free motor carriers of all 
state regulation.  Rather, the plain language of the FAAAA, 
and its preemption of only laws “relat[ing] to” carrier “price[s], 
route[s], or service[s],” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), demonstrates 
that Congress was concerned only with a limited set of state 
                                              
5 AEX characterizes Dilts as impermissibly relying on 
this “binds to” test to conclude that the FAAAA did not 
preempt California’s meal and rest break laws, arguing that 
such a test construes the scope of FAAAA preemption too 
narrowly.  While relying solely on such a “binds to” test may 
narrow FAAAA preemption to an unacceptable degree, Dilts 
merely recognized that the “binds to” test provides one of 
several possible avenues to demonstrate that a state law has a 
significant effect on carrier prices, routes, or services.  Dilts, 
769 F.3d at 649. 
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laws.  Dilts, 769 F.3d at 646-47.  Thus, “[t]he fact that laws 
may differ from state to state is not, on its own, cause for 
FAAAA preemption.”  Id. at 647.  Laws that are “more or less 
nationally uniform,” Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 65 
N.E.3d 1, 11-12 (Mass. 2016), are less likely to pose the kind 
of state law interference FAAAA preemption seeks to avoid.   
 
In sum, to assess the directness of a law’s effect on 
prices, routes, or services, courts should examine whether the 
law: (1) mentions a carrier’s prices, routes, or services; 
(2) specifically targets carriers as opposed to all businesses; 
and (3) addresses the carrier-customer relationship rather than 
non-customer-carrier relationships (e.g., carrier-employee).  If 
a law has a direct impact on carriers’ prices, routes, or services 
with respect to the transportation of property, then it is 
preempted unless it falls within one of the statutory exceptions.  
Though we can draw no firm line between laws whose effects 
on rates, routes, or services are indirect and laws whose effects 
are “tenuous, remote, or peripheral,” these factors, and perhaps 
other considerations, will guide courts in the inquiry. 
 
 To assess whether a law has a significant effect on a 
carrier’s prices, routes, or services, courts should consider 
whether: (1) the law binds a carrier to provide or not provide a 
particular price, route, or service; (2) the carrier has various 
avenues to comply with the law; (3) the law creates a 
patchwork of regulation that erects barriers to entry, imposes 
tariffs, or restricts the goods a carrier is permitted to transport; 
and (4) the law existed in one of the jurisdictions Congress 
determined lacked laws that regulate intrastate prices, routes, 
or services and thus, by implication, is a law Congress found 
not to interfere with the FAAAA’s deregulatory goal.  Other 
factors may also lead a court to decide that a state law has a 
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significant effect where the law undermines Congress’ goal of 
having competitive market forces dictate prices, routes, or 
services of motor carriers.6 
 
E 
 
We have examined each of these considerations and 
conclude that New Jersey’s ABC classification test is not 
preempted as it has neither a direct, nor an indirect, nor a 
significant effect on carrier prices, routes, or services.   
                                              
6 Before the Supreme Court’s rulings in Rowe and 
Dan’s City, our Court once framed the inquiry—albeit in the 
context of whether a defamation claim was preempted under 
the ADA (a question we answered in the negative, holding that 
the defamation claim was not preempted)—as whether the law 
or claim in question would “frustrate[] deregulation by 
interfering with competition through public utility-style 
regulation.”  Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 
F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).  Elaborating 
on regulation in a “public utility sense” in the context of airline 
services, our Court said that regulations of “the frequency and 
scheduling of transportation” and “the selection of markets” 
are public-utility styled regulations (which would thus be 
preempted under the ADA), whereas “provision of in-flight 
beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the handling of 
luggage, and similar amenities” are not services in a “public 
utility sense,” and thus could be regulated, for instance through 
state implementation of a duty to exercise reasonable care, the 
violation of which could give rise to ordinary tort claims.  Id. 
at 193 (quoting Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 
1259, 1261, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).  
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Any effect New Jersey’s ABC classification test has on 
prices, routes, or services is tenuous.  The test does not mention 
carrier prices, routes, or services, nor does it single out carriers.  
Indeed, the test applies to all businesses as part of the 
“backdrop” they “face in conducting their affairs.”  Lupian, 
905 F.3d at 136; see also Dilts, 769 F.3d at 646 (describing a 
state employment law as a “background regulation[]”).  The 
test also does not regulate carrier-customer interactions or 
other product outputs.  Rather, it only concerns employer-
worker relationships.  Laws governing how an employer pays 
its workers do not “directly regulate[] how [a carrier’s] service 
is performed[;]” they merely dictate how a carrier “behaves as 
an employer[.]”  DiFiore, 646 F.3d at 88.  As a result, the test 
is “steps removed” from regulating customer-carrier 
interactions through prices, routes, or services.  Costello, 810 
F.3d 1054 (quoting Dilts, 769 F.3d at 646).   
 
The New Jersey ABC classification test does not have a 
significant effect on prices, routes, or services either.  The test 
does not bind AEX to a particular method of providing services 
and thus it is unlike the preempted Massachusetts law at issue 
in Schwann, 813 F.3d 429.  The Massachusetts statute does not 
include New Jersey’s alternative method for reaching 
independent contractor status—that is, by demonstrating that 
the worker provides services outside of the putative employer’s 
“places of business.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-19(i)(6)(B).  
Thus, if the other prongs of the New Jersey classification test 
are met, the test allows an employer to classify a worker as an 
independent contractor if it shows that the worker either 
provides a service that is “outside the [employer’s] usual 
course of business . . . or [performs such service] outside of all 
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the places of business of [the employer].”  Id.7  No part of the 
New Jersey test categorically prevents carriers from using 
independent contractors.  As a result, the state law at issue here 
does not mandate a particular course of action—e.g., requiring 
carriers to use employees rather than independent 
contractors—and it offers carriers various options to comply 
with New Jersey employment law.8 
                                              
7 AEX focuses its argument on the B prong of the New 
Jersey test, but also asserts that the A and C prongs of the test 
are preempted.  AEX cites no case holding that prong A or C 
is preempted under either the FAAAA or the ADA.  This is not 
surprising given the legion of cases holding that the A and C 
prongs are not FAAAA-preempted.  See, e.g., Vargas v. Spirit 
Delivery & Distrib. Servs., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 3d 268, 281-84 
(D. Mass. 2017); DaSilva v. Border Transfer of Mass., Inc., 
227 F. Supp. 3d 154, 159-60 (D. Mass. 2017); Portillo v. Nat’l 
Freight, Inc., Civ. No. 15-7908, 2016 WL 5402215, at *5-6 
(D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2016); Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 65 
N.E.3d 1, 11-12 (Mass. 2016).  AEX also provides no reason 
why these prongs are preempted and in fact does not 
individually analyze them.  Thus, AEX has failed to carry its 
burden to demonstrate that the affirmative defense of FAAAA 
preemption applies to these prongs.   
8 AEX makes much of the fact that the Costello and 
Lupian courts observed that certain aspects of the IWPCA 
classification provision could be contracted around (i.e., 
employees could enter into contracts with carriers to allow 
certain paycheck deductions), Lupian, 905 F.3d at 135 n.12, 
whereas neither the New Jersey test nor the Massachusetts test 
allows the same contractual avoidance.  Contrary to AEX’s 
argument, this does not make the current case more analogous 
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AEX argues that applying the New Jersey law may 
require it to shift its model away from using independent 
contractors, which will increase its costs, and in turn, its prices.  
Specifically, AEX asserts that if it can no longer use 
independent contractors to perform its delivery services, then 
it will be forced to recruit employees, bring on a human 
resources department to manage them, acquire and maintain a 
fleet of vehicles and pay expense reimbursements, provide 
fringe benefits, plan and dictate delivery routes and timing, and 
pay overtime wages and employment taxes.  Our Court and our 
sister circuits have rejected similar lists of conclusory impacts.  
Lupian, 905 F.3d at 135-36; Costello, 810 F.3d at 1056; 
Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1189.  Though AEX correctly states 
that it need not proffer empirical evidence to support its 
assertions of significant impact at the pleading stage, see, e.g., 
Costello, 810 F.3d at 1055 (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373-74), 
                                              
to Schwann than to Costello and Lupian.  Though Costello and 
Lupian correctly took the IWPCA contractual loophole into 
account, neither court relied on it.  See Lupian, 905 F.3d at 136 
n.12 (observing that the Costello court “noted” the contractual 
allowance in the IWPCA); Costello, 810 F.3d at 1057 (noting 
in a single sentence that the IWPCA’s prohibition on 
deductions from wages can be contracted around, ultimately 
holding that the IWPCA is not “related to a price, route, or 
service of any motor carrier”).  Moreover, while a contractual 
circumvention option may provide another route for 
compliance, weighing against FAAAA preemption, it is not the 
only way a state statute can afford carriers some flexibility.  
Here, the New Jersey ABC classification test gives carriers 
options; it does not need to provide a contractual workaround 
to avoid preemption.  
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it does not provide even a logical connection between the 
application of New Jersey’s ABC classification test and the list 
of new costs it would purportedly incur.9   
 
AEX’s argument that it may be subject to other legal 
requirements arising from reclassification, citing only the 
Affordable Care Act,10 is equally unavailing.  In the words of 
the Costello court, “[c]onspicuously absent from [the 
company’s] parade of horrors is any citation of authority 
showing that it would be required to comply with [other] 
federal and state laws.”  Id. at 1056.  Instead, AEX “rel[ies] on 
conclusory allegations that compliance with the [NJWHL and 
NJWPL] will require [AEX] to switch its entire business model 
. . . [but w]e see no basis for concluding that [New Jersey law] 
would require that change given that the federal employment 
laws and other state labor laws [may] have different tests” for 
determining whether someone is an employee under a specific 
statute.  Id. (citations omitted).   
 
Furthermore, while “[w]e have no doubt that the 
disruption of a labor model—especially after services have 
been performed—could have negative financial and other 
consequences for an employer,” Lupian, 905 F.3d at 136, this 
impact on the employer does not equate to a significant impact 
on Congress’ goal of deregulation.  Congress sought to ensure 
                                              
9 For instance, we cannot see, nor has AEX explained, 
how reclassification of employees would necessarily require 
AEX to acquire a new fleet of vehicles or create a human 
resources department.   
10 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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market forces determined prices, routes, and services.  Nothing 
in that goal, however, meant to exempt workers from receiving 
proper wages, even if the wage laws had an incidental impact 
on carrier prices, routes, or services.11   
 
Finally, the fact that New Jersey’s ABC classification 
test differs from the federal test used in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19, will not result in 
a “‘patchwork’ of unique state legislation, which [AEX 
contends] regulates differently from state to state how motor 
carriers are required to perform their delivery services.”  Reply 
Br. at 14.  Most notably, New Jersey’s test is similar to that 
used in many other states.  See, e.g., RDI Logistics, 65 N.E.3d 
at 11-12 (holding that prongs A and C of the Massachusetts 
test, which are identical to those in the New Jersey test, were 
not FAAAA-preempted because they did not present a 
“patchwork problem” as they were “more or less nationally 
uniform,” unlike the Massachusetts B prong, which was 
preempted in Schwann because it was anomalous (quoting 
Schwann, 813 F.3d at 440)).    
 
                                              
11 Indeed, Congress evinced its intent for the FAAAA 
not to preempt general state wage laws when it included New 
Jersey—where, at the time the FAAAA was enacted, the 
NJWHL and NJWPL were already in effect, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 
34:11-56a7 & 34:11-4.1 (indicating initial enactment in 1966 
and 1965, respectively)—in its list of jurisdictions with laws 
that did not run afoul of the FAAAA.  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
103-677, at 86 (1994); see also Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1187-
88 & n.3. 
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Thus, AEX has not shown that New Jersey’s ABC 
classification test has a “significant impact” on Congress’ 
deregulatory efforts with respect to motor carrier businesses, 
nor are the NJWHL and NJWPL—typical state wage and hour 
laws—the kinds of preexisting state regulations with which 
Congress was concerned when it passed the FAAAA.12  See 
Lupian, 905 F.3d at 135-36; Schwann, 813 F.3d at 438; 
Costello, 810 F.3d at 1050-51; Amerijet, 627 F. App’x at 751; 
Dilts, 769 F.3d at 647-48; Gary, 397 F.3d at 189-90; 
Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1187-89.  Notably, eight of the ten 
jurisdictions that Congress identified as not regulating 
intrastate prices, routes, and services “had laws for 
differentiating between an employee and an independent 
contractor,” Su, 903 F.3d at 967, and at least three codified 
ABC tests similar to that of New Jersey, see Alaska Stat. § 
23.20.525(a)(10) (1992); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 3302(9)(k) 
(1992); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(B) (1992).  Therefore, 
AEX’s patchwork argument fails. 
 
 Accordingly, any effect the New Jersey ABC 
classification test has on prices, routes, or services with respect 
to the transportation of property is tenuous and insignificant.  
See Lupian, 905 F.3d at 136.  As a result, the test is not 
preempted. 
                                              
12 As the Schwann court observed, while Congress 
sought “to avoid ‘a patchwork of state service-determining 
laws,’” we can assume that “Congress intended to leave 
untouched” “pre-existing and customary manifestation[s] of 
the state’s police power.”  813 F.3d at 438 (quoting Rowe, 552 
U.S. at 373).   
 27 
III 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying AEX’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and remand for further proceedings.  
